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The Emerging Oversimplifications of the Government 
Speech Doctrine: From Substantive Content to a 
“Jurisprudence of Labels” 
Barry P. McDonald 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the past couple of decades, the U.S. Supreme Court has 
created, and continues to develop the contours of, what it refers to 
as the “government speech” doctrine. In its current incarnation, this 
doctrine holds that whenever it can be said that the government is 
engaging in speech, then it is not subject to First Amendment 
limitations with respect to the impact its actions or message may 
have on private speakers associated with that speech. Under some 
iteration of this doctrine, the Court has sanctioned the imposition of 
normally prohibited viewpoint restrictions on private speakers who 
accept government funds1 or on government employees speaking on 
matters of public concern;2 the compulsion of private party funding 
for speech with which it disagrees;3 and the selective exclusion of 
speakers from traditional public fora based on the content of the 
speakers’ message.4 In other words, the government speech doctrine 
has become a First Amendment “escape hatch” for placing 
substantial restrictions or burdens on private speakers that would 
otherwise be subject to serious judicial scrutiny and constitutional 
doubt if traditional free speech principles were applied to these 
situations. 
                                                                                                           
  Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law. I would like to express my 
thanks to John Fee for conceiving of and spearheading the symposium at which I first 
presented these thoughts. I owe him additional thanks for inspiring the title of this Article. 
While thinking about “The Emerging Complexities of Government Speech,” as John had 
titled the symposium, it occurred to me that many of those conceded complexities are the 
product of the Court’s current oversimplification of the driving principles which animate the 
government speech doctrine.  
1.  Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991). 
2.  Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006). 
3.   Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550 (2005).  
4.  Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125 (2009). 
DO NOT DELETE 3/8/2011  4:21 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2010 
2072 
In this Article, I will briefly trace the development of the 
government speech doctrine and demonstrate that it has become 
unhinged from its original purpose of assisting in the ordering of 
governmental and private speech interests in cases where they 
intersect and conflict. Instead, the current Court has transformed the 
doctrine from a tool of substantive analysis into what Justice Breyer 
has recently termed “a jurisprudence of labels.”5 On this view, 
whenever the Court can label a message involving the interaction of 
both government and private speakers as primarily that of the 
government, it washes its hands of assessing the constitutionality of 
the burdens placed on the interests of the private speakers. I will 
contend that this modern development is misguided and urge a 
return to a formulation and application of the government speech 
doctrine as it was originally conceived.  
II. ORIGINS AND TRANSFORMATION OF THE DOCTRINE 
Although the Court has, thus far, applied the government speech 
doctrine in the context of four different types of cases—those 
involving compelled subsidies by private parties of another’s speech, 
restrictions attached to government subsidies of private speech, 
government employee speech, and speech on public property—it 
arose in the first category of cases: claims by private speakers that 
being compelled by the government to financially subsidize speech 
with which they disagree violates the First Amendment.  
In Abood v. Detroit Board of Education,6 a group of public school 
teachers contended that the government violated their First 
Amendment rights by making them pay the equivalent of member 
dues to a private teachers’ union that espoused views on various 
issues.7 The Court disagreed with this to the extent the union used 
the payments to fund collective bargaining activities germane to its 
purpose, but agreed it was unconstitutional to compel funding for 
political or ideological activities with which the plaintiffs disagreed.8 
                                                                                                           
5.  Id. at 1140 (Breyer, J., concurring). It should be clear by now that the scope of my 
undertaking in this Article is very specific—to examine the Court’s recently-created 
government speech doctrine. Hence, I make no attempt to address the multitude of other First 
Amendment issues that may arise in connection with the government’s role as a speaker. For 
one classic exposition of such expanded issues, see MARK G. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT 
SPEAKS (1983).  
6.  431 U.S. 209, 215 (1977). 
7.  Id. at 211–17. 
8.  Id. at 217–37.  
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Justice Powell wrote separately to urge stronger First Amendment 
protections for the plaintiffs than the majority appeared to require.9 
As part of his argument, he added a footnote explaining why 
ordinary taxpayers could be made to fund government, but not 
private, speech with which they disagreed.10 According to Powell, 
“the government is representative of the people,” while unions are 
“representative only of one segment of the population . . . with 
certain common interests.”11 In other words, he appeared to be 
arguing that because in our democratic system the government is the 
appointed agent of at least the majority of the people who elect it, it 
is fair enough for those who disagree with its policies to also fund its 
speech. On this view, one could say dissenting taxpayers consent to 
such an arrangement under the democratic social contract we are 
presumed to accept. 
 Several years later, the Court was facing the question of the 
extent to which an integrated state bar association (i.e., one that 
lawyers of a state are required to join and pay member dues to) could 
use a member’s dues to fund political or ideological speech with 
which that member disagreed.12 Drawing on Justice Powell’s 
footnote in Abood, the defendant State Bar of California argued that 
as a government entity, it was entitled to spend member dues on 
whatever speech it wished as long as it was pursuing legitimate 
government goals.13 This was so, it argued, because government 
bodies must take positions that some taxpayers will inevitably 
disagree with in order to perform their legitimate functions of 
governance.14 Indeed, this argument had persuaded the California 
Supreme Court in the decision below to reject the First Amendment 
claims of the dissenting bar members.15 
Labeling this “the so-called ‘government speech doctrine,’” 
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for a unanimous Court, appeared to 
accept the logic of it but held that the California State Bar (“State 
Bar”) was not sufficiently like an ordinary government agency to 
avail itself of the doctrine.16 Pointing out that the State Bar received 
                                                                                                           
9.  Id. at 244–64 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 10.  Id. at 259 n.13. 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1 (1990). 
 13.  Id. at 10–11. 
 14.  Id.  
 15. Id. at 10. 
 16.  Id. at 11–13. 
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its funding from member dues instead of legislative appropriations, 
lacked direct enforcement authority with respect to its rules, was 
created to provide “specialized professional advice” to the State 
Supreme Court, and consisted of lawyers rather than general citizens 
or voters, he reasoned that the State Bar was not like “traditional 
government agencies and officials” which “are expected as a part of 
the democratic process to represent and to espouse the views of a 
majority of their constituents.”17 Accordingly, Rehnquist concluded 
it would be inappropriate to shield the State Bar against compelled 
funding challenges pursuant to the rationale of the government 
speech doctrine. Moreover, he reasoned, since the regulatory 
purpose of the State Bar was analogous to that of a private union 
(i.e., to organize and regulate a group of laborers with common 
interests), the State Bar was also subject to the Abood rule allowing 
the use of dissenting member dues for activities germane to that 
purpose but not for engaging in non-germane political or ideological 
activities that they disagreed with.18   
Hence, in Keller, a unanimous Court essentially blessed the 
notion that regular taxpayers do not have a First Amendment right 
to prevent ordinary government agencies from using their taxes to 
promote disagreeable views—thus giving the government speech 
doctrine its first official recognition by the Court beyond its humble 
beginnings in Justice Powell’s Abood concurrence. Conversely, the 
Keller Court held that if a subgroup within the polity is being 
compelled to pay into an association for a defined regulatory 
purpose, whether that association is called a government entity like 
the State Bar or a private entity like the Abood union, dissenting 
funders have a First Amendment right to prevent the association 
from using funds for disagreeable speech that is not germane to the 
regulatory purpose. Another way of saying this is that compelled 
associations have no right to use dissenting member funds to 
promote their viewpoints over that of the dissenters (i.e., engage in 
viewpoint discrimination against them) with respect to non-
regulatory matters.  
Chief Justice Rehnquist did not expend much intellectual effort 
to explain the theoretical basis for this distinction in First 
Amendment rights between an ordinary taxpayer and a person being 
compelled to associate with others for particular regulatory purposes. 
                                                                                                           
 17.  Id.  
 18.  Id. at 13–14. 
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He merely pointed out that general government representatives need 
to be able to advocate for policy decisions they are charged with 
making, and if citizens who disagree with such views were able to 
silence them, “debate over issues of great concern to the public 
would be limited to those in the private sector, and the process of 
government as we know it radically transformed.”19 In other words, 
inherent in our system of democratic majority rule and representative 
leadership is a structural subordination, to the government’s need to 
govern, of an individual’s general “freedom of belief” on which the 
Abood Court premised its First Amendment right against compelled 
funding of disagreeable views20—at least when it comes to funding 
with general taxes basic governmental functions with which a citizen 
may disagree. One might even say that American citizens are 
presumed to consent to this subordination when they choose to live 
under our system of governance after reaching an age of maturity 
when opting out to live under the government of a different country 
might be feasible. 
Such presumed consent provides the compelled payment of taxes 
to support general governance with a democratic legitimacy that 
obviously does not obtain in a more limited association (and its 
attendant funding) that is compelled to achieve special regulatory 
objectives. In the latter cases, it is solely the regulatory interests that 
justify the compulsion and consequent override of an individual’s 
freedom of belief, and such interests do not justify compelled 
funding for activities not germane to achieving them.  
But, one might ask, what about compelled taxpayer funding for 
disagreeable activities that might be characterized as going beyond 
those necessary or germane to general governance? If an individual 
enjoys a general freedom of belief, the argument would go, surely it 
can only be subordinated to those necessary or germane activities 
that can fairly be said to lie within the scope of a citizen’s presumed 
democratic consent. For instance, is a legislative decision to fund 
abortions, or a president’s decision to call for the honoring of a 
national day of prayer, activities that are necessary or germane to 
general governance? The difficulty of such an inquiry perhaps 
explains Chief Justice Rehnquist’s implied suggestion that it would 
simply be impractical for our system of government to operate if 
                                                                                                           
 19.  Id. at 12–13. 
 20.  Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 234–35 (1977); see also Glickman v. 
Wileman Bros. & Elliot, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 471–72 (1997). 
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taxpayers had a constitutional right not to fund disagreeable 
government speech. By contrast, when funding is compelled to 
achieve defined regulatory purposes, it is easier to draw the 
germaneness line and ask whether a given activity falls on one side of 
the line or the other. We might refer to this difficulty of determining 
the germaneness of general government activities as the 
Impracticability Principle of Keller, which justifies the invocation of 
the government speech doctrine. 
A second principle underlying that doctrine can be derived from 
Justice Powell’s observation in Abood, which Chief Justice Rehnquist 
quoted in Keller,21 that the government can compel funding for 
disagreeable activities because it is “representative of the people” in a 
way that a compelled association such as a union is not. This 
observation seems to be invoking another aspect of democratic 
legitimacy—the notion that it is fair enough for dissenting citizens to 
fund government speech that represents the views of the majority 
since they have consented to this system. By contrast, such 
legitimacy does not obtain in a more limited, compelled association, 
and thus cannot serve as a salve for viewpoint discrimination outside 
of the association’s core activities. In a later case in which Justice 
Kennedy was writing for the Court, he appeared to be elaborating 
on this principle by suggesting that the availability of the 
government speech doctrine to override First Amendment objections 
to it depends on whether the official or agency speaking is subject to 
“traditional political controls to ensure responsible government 
action.”22 In other words, one can only be sure that government 
speech is imbued with democratic legitimacy to the extent that the 
government speaker is subject to democratic accountability for its 
speech. We can refer to this as the Accountability Principle justifying 
the application of the government speech doctrine. 
A third principle underlying that doctrine which is derivable from 
Keller relates to the speech autonomy interests of the dissenting 
funder. In a general governance situation where an ordinary taxpayer 
is funding disagreeable government speech, the impingement on her 
speech autonomy interests seems fairly attenuated given that she is 
just one member of the entire polity contributing to it. On the other 
hand, when a select subset of the polity is being compelled to fund 
disagreeable speech not germane to the reason for the compulsion, 
                                                                                                           
 21.  Keller, 496 U.S. at 11. 
 22.  Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 229 (2000). 
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the violation of their autonomy interests seems substantially greater. 
This seems to explain Chief Justice Rehnquist’s focus on the fact that 
the State Bar was funded by individual member dues, rather than 
general legislative appropriations, as a basis for distinguishing that 
entity from an agency of general governance.23 We can label this as 
the Autonomy Principle justifying the application of the government 
speech doctrine. 
These three principles, then, the Impracticability, Accountability, 
and Autonomy Principles, help to explain the basis for the 
government speech doctrine as it was originally conceived and 
applied in Keller. Moreover, the Court’s analysis clearly implied that 
the doctrine was not to be applied automatically to excuse 
infringements on a person’s freedom of belief whenever it could be 
said that they occurred in the course of the government itself 
speaking. Rather, it suggested that First Amendment scrutiny had to 
first be applied to determine if the foregoing principles indicated that 
a given case involved the type of government speaker that justified 
impingements on that freedom. After all, the Keller Court never 
stated that the State Bar was not a government body—indeed, the 
Supreme Court of California had determined that it was a state 
agency under California law—but just that the State Bar was not the 
type of government body that justified the application of the 
government speech doctrine to excuse infringements upon the 
freedom of belief of dissenting members. Thus, in a later case where 
Justice Scalia asserted that the Keller Court deemed the State Bar to 
be a private speaker to help justify his recasting of the government 
speech doctrine as an absolute exemption from First Amendment 
scrutiny whenever any government entity infringes private beliefs in 
the course of speaking,24 he was either mistaken or simply 
mischaracterizing that decision.  
The next compelled speech subsidy dispute to come before the 
Court involved a state university student’s challenge to a mandatory 
student activity fee that was used to fund speech of student groups 
with which he disagreed.25 Thus, this case did not present the 
government speech issue addressed by Keller. Nonetheless, Justice 
Kennedy, writing for the Court, began his analysis by pointing out 
                                                                                                           
 23.  Keller, 496 U.S. at 11. 
 24.  Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 559 (2005). This issue is discussed 
in more depth at infra notes 74–82 and accompanying text.  
 25.  Southworth, 529 U.S. 217. 
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that if the objectionable speech had been that of the public 
university, different principles would govern and the issue would 
have been “whether traditional political controls to ensure 
responsible government action would be sufficient to overcome First 
Amendment objections and to allow the challenged program under 
the principle that the government can speak for itself.”26 Hence, in 
Kennedy’s view and consistent with Keller, whether the public 
university could avail itself of the government speech doctrine, if it 
had been the speaker, depended upon the type of government 
agency it was—and how politically responsive it could be said to be 
pursuant to the Accountability Principle discussed above. The Court 
did not intimate that the university’s speech would have been free 
from First Amendment scrutiny simply because a government body 
would have been the speaker. And as to the objectionable student 
group speech that was at issue in the case, the Court held that the 
funding students’ Abood and Keller rights were adequately protected 
by requiring that all funding decisions be made on a viewpoint-
neutral basis since it would be impossible to identify speech that was 
germane to a university’s broad educational mission (a rationale 
similar to the Impracticability Principle applicable to objectionable 
government speech).27 
The Court’s latest compelled speech subsidy decisions involved 
three different cases raising a similar complaint—that the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture (USDA) was violating the First 
Amendment rights of food producers and handlers who objected to 
fees levied upon them to fund generic industry advertising 
promoting their respective food products. In the first such case, 
involving California tree fruit producers and handlers, a closely 
divided Court rejected the First Amendment claim on the grounds 
that (1) all of the subsidized advertising was germane to a legitimate 
regulatory program, was non-ideological in nature, and contained no 
messages with which the plaintiffs disagreed (hence satisfying the 
principles of Keller), and (2) the challenged law was better classified 
as a species of economic regulation than a law abridging speech 
which warranted heightened scrutiny.28 The Court had no occasion 
to address the potential application of the government speech 
doctrine to justify the compelled subsidies because, as the principal 
                                                                                                           
 26.  Id. at 229. 
 27. Id. at 229–35. 
 28.  Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliot, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 467–77 (1997). 
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dissenting opinion in the case pointed out, the government chose 
not to rely on that argument.29  
In the second such case, involving mushroom handlers, a divided 
Court reversed course and held that the compelled advertising 
subsidies violated the First Amendment under the principles of 
Abood and Keller.30 It distinguished Glickman on the grounds that 
whereas the advertising fees imposed in that case were ancillary to a 
broader regulatory regime involving the production and sale of 
California tree fruits, in the case under review, the industry 
advertising was the sole regulatory goal.31 Hence, there was no 
legitimate regulatory purpose that justified the compelled 
association; forced association and subsidies for expressive purposes 
only implicated core freedom of belief concerns that outweighed the 
economic goals of the program.32 And although the USDA 
attempted to argue that the subsidies could be justified under the 
government speech doctrine, the Court ruled that the USDA had 
essentially waived this argument by failing to raise it in the court 
below.33 
Thus, presumably after taking the Court’s hint that a properly 
raised government speech defense would be seriously considered, in 
the third case involving compelled subsidies for industry advertising 
of food products (here, beef products) the USDA pressed the 
argument and succeeded in winning over a bare majority of the 
Court.34 Noting that the beef program was very similar to the 
mushroom program invalidated in United Foods, Justice Scalia, 
writing for five Justices, nonetheless held that viewing these 
programs as the speech of the government cured any First 
Amendment problems associated with them.35 Further, viewing them 
                                                                                                           
 29.  See id. at 483 n.2 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 30.  United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 415–16 (2001). 
 31.  Id. at 413–16. 
 32.  See id. at 415–416. 
 33.  Id. at 416–17. 
 34.  Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n., 544 U.S. 550 (2005). Although the vote was 6-
3, Justice Ginsburg declined to join Justice Scalia’s government speech analysis and concurred 
on other grounds. Id. at 569–70 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in judgment) 
 35.  Id. at 557–67 (majority opinion). This raises the question as to why the government 
failed to press the government speech defense in the first two cases. I submit it was something 
other than incompetence on the part of the government lawyers. Rather, it was because the 
USDA programs in all of the food cases looked more like the State Bar program to which the 
Keller court held that the government speech doctrine did not apply. They were defined 
regulatory programs administered by specific agencies where the dues used for disagreeable 
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as government speech was proper because the USDA ultimately 
controlled the message being communicated in the ads.36 So an 
identical program that was a violation of a person’s freedom of belief 
under Abood and Keller just four years earlier all of a sudden became 
constitutional under the theory that whenever speech can be 
attributed to any government speaker, that freedom must be 
subordinated to the state’s interest in governing. 
But how, one might ask, did Justice Scalia get beyond the 
teaching of Keller and Southworth that it was not the fact that any 
speaker claiming government status was entitled to automatically 
elevate its interests over the First Amendment interests of affected 
citizens, but only those “traditional government agencies and 
officials”37 that “participate in the general government of the 
State,”38 such as “a governor, a mayor, or a state tax commission?”39 
According to Scalia, in Keller and other cases “invalidating exactions 
to subsidize speech, the speech was, or presumed to be, that of an 
entity other than the government itself”40—in other words, the 
speech of a private speaker. But as mentioned earlier, nowhere in 
Keller did Chief Justice Rehnquist refer to the State Bar as a private 
entity—in direct contravention of the ultimate authority on that 
issue, the Supreme Court of California—but rather as an entity that 
was not sufficiently like a “typical government official or agency”41 
that required an exemption from freedom of belief constraints in 
order to properly function. Thus, with one glib mischaracterization 
of the Court’s seminal government speech decision, Justice Scalia 
managed to transform that doctrine from one requiring a substantive 
analysis of the competing public-private speech interests to 
determine if it should apply in a given case, to a blank check for the 
government to impinge on citizens’ freedom of belief whenever 
speech is characterized as coming from a government speaker. And 
                                                                                                           
speech were levied only on those subject to the regulatory program. In other words, the 
Impracticability, Accountability, and Autonomy Principles that drove Keller’s reasoning all 
pointed away from a government speech analysis. So it was quite a surprise in Johanns when 
the Court did a “180” from its prior decision regarding the virtually identical mushroom 
program in United Foods that it said violated the First Amendment, and held that the beef 
program did not even merit First Amendment scrutiny because it was government speech.   
 36.  Id. at 561–62. 
 37.  Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 13 (1990). 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  Johanns, 544 U.S. at 559.  
 41.  Keller, 496 U.S. at 12 (emphasis added). 
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this transformation encompassed all situations involving government 
speech, regardless of whether such impingements would be necessary 
for a given agency or program to function effectively (the 
Impracticability Principle discussed above), or whether the speech 
would be sufficiently subject to democratic control (the 
Accountability Principle), or whether the burden of the speech 
would be evenly distributed or placed on a select group (the 
Autonomy Principle).  
However, while blithely assuming (contrary to Keller’s explicit 
example) that no government entities or programs can operate 
effectively subject to a right against compelled funding,42 Scalia at 
least addressed the Accountability and Autonomy Principles 
underlying the government speech doctrine. As to the former, while 
he acknowledged that “[s]ome of our cases have justified compelled 
funding of government speech by pointing out that government 
speech is subject to democratic accountability,”43 he read that 
limitation as simply requiring that government actors control the 
message—i.e., that it indeed be government versus private speech—
and not that those actors realistically be accountable to the public for 
the speech.44 Indeed, in Johanns itself Scalia concluded that the fact 
Congress had created the beef ad funding program and given the 
USDA authority to oversee it provided adequate accountability even 
though the funded ads identified a private beef industry group 
(America’s Beef Producers) as their sponsor.45 Although one might 
wonder how one can have government speech at all that is presented 
as that of a private speaker, as the three dissenting Justices in Johanns 
argued, how can there be true democratic accountability for speech if 
the public does not know it is that of the government?46 Simple, 
Scalia answered. Just hold the politicians who authorized the speech 
accountable for it. But how, one might ask, can the public hold them 
accountable without knowing that they were responsible for the 
speech? Scalia offered little in response to this problem other than to 
                                                                                                           
 42.  See Johanns, 544 U.S. at 559. 
 43.  Id. at 563. 
 44.  See id. at 563–64 & n.7. 
 45.  Id.  
 46.  Id. at 570 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); id. at 570–80 (Souter, J., dissenting, joined by 
Stevens, J., and Kennedy, J.).   
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note that the dissent cited no authority for the proposition that 
government speech identify the government as the speaker.47 
As to the Autonomy Principle, citing an inapposite 
Establishment Clause case for support, Justice Scalia boldly declared 
that a compelled subsidy analysis is “altogether unaffected” by 
whether the subsidy is broadly levied on all citizens or whether a 
discrete group of citizens is targeted to pay it.48 And rather than 
address the problem with selective compelled subsidies—that they 
constitute a greater impingement on speech autonomy interests 
because of the unequal nature of the compulsion—Scalia dismissed 
the entire issue with a blithe rhetorical flourish, observing that “the 
injury of compelled funding . . . does not stem from the 
Government’s mode of accounting.”49 
Hence, the majority in Johanns transformed Keller’s meaningful 
approach to the government speech problem that balanced 
democratic functionality against freedom of belief interests into a 
vapid presupposition that the former concerns should automatically 
prevail even in situations not significantly implicating them. The 
irony of the bare majority that Justice Scalia received for the Johanns 
decision was that Justice Breyer, who later complained strongly 
about this approach,50 reluctantly supplied the critical fifth vote for 
it. Writing separately, he stated that he would have preferred to 
reject the plaintiffs’ compelled subsidy claim on the grounds that the 
beef advertising program was a species of economic regulation a la 
the reasoning of Glickman, but that he would accept the 
government speech approach as a less desirable solution to the food 
advertising cases.51  
All of this raises the question of why Justice Scalia was so eager 
to accomplish the Keller to Johanns transformation of the 
                                                                                                           
 47.  Id. at 564 n.7 (majority opinion). Indeed, one could envision a very negative public 
reaction to the “Beef, It’s What’s For Dinner” ads that were at issue in Johanns if people 
perceived that the government was promoting beef consumption after the spate of recent 
studies connecting that consumption to an increased risk of cancer or heart attacks. At least the 
speech of the State Bar in Keller would have been recognized as such, even though that still 
did not satisfy the Court that the government speech doctrine should be applied to it. 
 48.  Id. at 562. In dissent, Justice Souter cogently explained why the Establishment 
Clause case Justice Scalia cited for his assertion provided little support for it. Id. at 576 n.4 
(Souter, J., dissenting).   
 49.  Id. at 563 (majority opinion). 
 50.  See infra notes 83–85. 
 51.  Johanns, 544 U.S. at 569 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
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government speech doctrine.52 The answer can be found in one of 
his concurring opinions from a related case eight years earlier. There, 
a majority of the Court held that the First Amendment was not 
violated by a statute requiring the National Endowment for the Arts 
to take into consideration the values of decency and respect of the 
American people in making artistic grant decisions, provided such 
decisions did not amount to invidious viewpoint discrimination.53 
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, concurred solely in the 
result and argued that the “Congress shall make no law abridging 
the freedom of speech” language of the First Amendment means 
that while the government cannot restrict directly the speech of 
private citizens, when it speaks itself or favors private speakers’ 
viewpoints through grants of money it is not abridging anyone’s 
speech.54 In other words, under Scalia’s textualist reading of the First 
Amendment, that provision only protects private citizens against 
direct restrictions on their speech, and has no application when the 
government itself speaks or selectively sponsors the speech or 
viewpoints of citizens.  
In his Finley concurrence, Justice Scalia was not thinking about 
situations involving compelled subsidies of disagreeable speech, but 
rather the selective government funding of private speakers. Yet he 
obliquely extended his textualist rationale to the former type of 
situation in Johanns,55 and, four years later, Justice Alito completed 
this reworking of the justification for the government speech 
doctrine. Writing for the Court in an unrelated case and citing 
                                                                                                           
 52. See infra notes 58–72 and accompanying text for a discussion of certain 
intermediate doctrinal developments that undoubtedly abetted this transformation.  
 53.  Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 580–87 (1998). 
 54.  See id. at 598–99 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (“It is the very business of 
government to favor and disfavor points of view on . . . innumerable subjects . . . . And it 
makes not a bit of difference . . . whether these officials further their (and, in a democracy, our) 
favored point of view by achieving it directly . . . or by giving money to others who achieve or 
advocate it . . . . None of this has anything to do with abridging anyone’s speech.”). Scalia 
acknowledged two limitations on his principle of viewpoint favoritism. First, where the 
government has created a limited public forum for private speech, all viewpoints must be 
treated equally. Id. at 599. Second, where a denial of public funding would have a significant 
coercive effect on the viewpoints of private speakers because no other funding was available, 
there might be a First Amendment problem. Id. at 596–97. 
 55.  See Johanns, 544 U.S. at 553 (framing question presented as “whether the generic 
advertising at issue is the Government’s own speech and therefore is exempt from First 
Amendment scrutiny”); id. at 559 (asserting that “[w]e have generally assumed, though not 
yet squarely held, that compelled funding of government speech does not alone raise First 
Amendment concerns”). 
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Johanns, Alito asserted that when the government “engag[es] in [its] 
own expressive conduct, then the Free Speech Clause has no 
application. The Free Speech Clause restricts government regulation 
of private speech; it does not regulate government speech.”56 Hence, 
what began in Keller as a considered judgment about the situations 
in which it was appropriate to apply the government speech doctrine 
by focusing on the mix of governmental and private speech interests 
at stake, became a blanket exemption for the government to override 
any conflicting private speech interests in cases where it could be said 
to be the principal speaker. And this was accomplished on the back 
of Justice Scalia’s textualist theory, which several members of the 
Court (primarily the majority conservative bloc) appear to have fully 
bought into at this point. 
But how convincing is this theory? Not very. In Finley, Justice 
Scalia reasoned that since the word “abridge” in the Free Speech 
Clause means “to contract, to diminish; to deprive of,” when speech 
restrictions are attached to government funding no such contraction 
occurs because people can decline the funding and remain free from 
them.57 But one could just as plausibly argue that when the 
government passes a law attaching speech restrictions to government 
subsidies for expression, that is indeed a law “abridging the freedom 
of speech” since the funds are contingent upon such an abridgment. 
In other words, “make no law” means no law, including those 
containing contingent abridgments. Indeed, if one wants to take the 
purely textualist approach espoused by Scalia, his reading is less 
plausible than the latter reading, since the use of the word “abridge” 
signals that even slight impairments on the freedom of speech are 
unacceptable—including contingent abridgments. Had the Founders 
intended to limit free speech protection to direct restrictions on 
speech, one would have thought they would simply have said, 
“Congress shall make no laws restricting or prohibiting speech.”  
Moreover, even if Scalia’s textualist argument was persuasive as 
to conditions placed on the receipt of government speech subsidies a 
la Finley, to simply transfer without analysis this interpretation to the 
compelled speech subsidies at issue in Johanns is misguided. It might 
be one thing to say that the freedom of speech remains unabridged 
in the former type of case because one can always decline the 
government funding, but this rationale is simply inapplicable to cases 
                                                                                                           
 56.  Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1131 (2009). 
 57.  Finley, 524 U.S. at 595–96. 
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where a select group of citizens are compelled to fund government 
speech with which they disagree. In the latter cases, there is clearly 
some abridgment of a citizen’s freedom of belief under precedents 
such as Abood and Keller. The correct approach, then, is to consider 
whether that abridgment is justified by countervailing government 
interests in a given case, and not to simply pretend that there is no 
abridgment because a government entity or official is characterized 
as the main speaker. 
In the end, the Johanns majority sanctions the government 
targeting a select group of taxpayers to fund speech no matter how 
disagreeable to them, as long as the government claims the speech or 
at least does not present it as being from the funders themselves. The 
potential problems are manifold. Could, for example, a democratic 
Congress pass a law levying a special assessment on doctors’ groups 
or health insurers to fund an ad campaign urging the passage of 
health care reforms they perceive as detrimental to them? And better 
yet, could Congress permit citizens’ groups to participate in the ad 
program and then issue the ads under the moniker “Citizens for 
Better Health Care?” There is no reason under the Johanns 
reformulation of the government speech doctrine that this could not 
be done consistent with the First Amendment. Suffice it to say that 
Johanns leaves much to be desired in terms of connecting the blanket 
First Amendment exemption for government speech it creates to the 
theories animating its original conceptualization.  
In sum, the government speech doctrine was first recognized by 
the Court in Keller as part of an attempt to identify the 
circumstances under which it would be appropriate to elevate the 
interests of the government in expressing viewpoints in order to 
govern over impingements on the freedom of belief of dissenting 
funders of such speech. Johanns then morphed that doctrine into an 
approach that subordinates the rights of conscience of dissenting 
funders in all cases of government speech on flawed theoretical 
premises. To be fair to Justice Scalia, however, he did get some 
precedential support for this misguided approach from certain 
government subsidy speech cases authored by Justice Kennedy that 
were decided between Keller and Johanns. The next section will 
briefly analyze those cases and describe how they contributed to 
derailing the government speech doctrine from its intended purpose. 
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III. GOVERNMENT SUBSIDY DECISIONS 
A year after Keller, the Court decided Rust v. Sullivan.58 There, 
with Justice Souter having just replaced Justice Brennan, Chief 
Justice Rehnquist was able to muster four other votes for the 
position that the government could constitutionally ban the 
operators of family planning clinics from providing abortion 
counseling as a condition of receiving federal funding, rejecting the 
contention that such a ban amounted to viewpoint discrimination 
prohibited by the First Amendment.59 The Chief Justice relied on a 
line of decisions that he interpreted as standing for the proposition 
that although the government must refrain from unduly interfering 
with the exercise of constitutional rights, it has no duty to subsidize 
them.60 A corollary of this principle, according to Rehnquist, was 
that the government may fund certain activities, including speech, to 
the exclusion of others.61 The Court made no reference to Keller or 
the government speech doctrine. 
Four years later, Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, built on 
this theme from Rust in dictum in a case where a religious student 
publication contended that the denial of printing subsidies by a 
public university amounted to unconstitutional viewpoint 
discrimination because secular student publications were eligible to 
receive them.62 The Court agreed with the plaintiff on the grounds 
that the university had created a virtual public forum to encourage 
student speech with the funds, and any viewpoint discrimination in 
administering them was unconstitutional.63 Kennedy rejected the 
university’s reliance on Rust and related cases to argue that content-
based funding decisions to accomplish educational objectives were 
constitutional. Instead, he characterized Rust as standing for the 
principle that when the government itself speaks or grants funds to 
private speakers to convey the government’s own message, it is then 
entitled to control that message—including restricting fund 
                                                                                                           
 58.  500 U.S. 173 (1991). 
 59.  Id. There is little doubt that if Justice Brennan had remained on the Court one 
more year, the decision would have gone 5–4 in the opposite direction. Indeed, one suspects 
from Justice Souter’s later voting pattern that he would have been on the side of the dissenting 
justices if he had possessed a little more experience on the Court when Rust was decided.  
 60.  Id. at 192–200. 
 61.  Id.  
 62.  Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995). 
 63.  Id. at 828–37. 
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recipients from expressing conflicting views.64 But in the case under 
review, Kennedy reasoned, the government was facilitating the 
expression of a diversity of private views through the creation of a 
limited public forum.65 Once again, the Court made no mention of 
Keller or the government speech doctrine.  
Justice Kennedy clearly took some liberties with Rust since the 
Court never characterized the government as a speaker or promoter 
of a message in that case, but rather simply as a funder of a chosen 
set of activities which included certain private speech (i.e., family 
planning counseling that excluded discussions of abortion as a 
method of such planning). Kennedy later extended this 
reconceptualization of Rust in his opinion for the Court in the 
Southworth compelled speech subsidy case discussed earlier.66 In 
dictum in that case, he set forth the central premise of the 
government speech doctrine articulated in Keller—that as a general 
rule, the government may use taxpayer money to support its 
expression of views that the taxpayer may disagree with—but oddly 
cited to Rust, rather than Keller, in support of it.67 One year later, 
Kennedy again continued his morphing of Rust in a government 
speech subsidy decision where, writing for the Court, he cited to 
Rust, Rosenberger, and Southworth to support the proposition that 
the government can promote its own views through its speech or 
funding decisions.68 But this time he was more candid about the 
remaking of Rust, pointing out that “[t]he Court in Rust did not 
place explicit reliance on the rationale that the counseling activities 
of the doctors under Title X amounted to government speech; when 
interpreting the holding in later cases, however, we have explained 
Rust on this understanding.”69 (What he did not say was that they 
were all his own majority opinions that had done this.) And 
somewhat ironically, two years later in a plurality opinion that Justice 
Kennedy did not join, the Court seemed to return to the original 
meaning of Rust that the government can choose to fund certain 
speech while not funding other types, and explicitly rejected the 
                                                                                                           
 64.  Id. at 832–34. 
 65.  Id. 
 66.  See supra notes 25–27 and accompanying text. 
 67.  Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 229 (2000). 
 68.  Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 540–42 (2001). 
 69.  Id. at 541. 
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characterization of Rust as being dependent upon the government 
speaking a message.70 
Thus we can see that Justice Kennedy contributed substantially 
to the decoupling of the government speech doctrine from Keller, a 
case that had a lot to do with that issue, and recoupling it to Rust—a 
case having little to do with it. This raises the questions of why 
Kennedy did this, and whether it matters. As to why, one suspects it 
had something to do with the specific results of Keller and Rust. 
Keller was the decision in which the Court validated the principle 
that as a general matter the government can take positions contrary 
to that of dissenting citizens, but the Court found it inapplicable to 
the agency speaking in that case (the State Bar) and decided against 
the government’s position. By contrast, in Rust the Court sided on 
behalf of the government interests over those of the dissenting 
private speakers (the objecting staff of the family planning clinics). 
Thus, when Kennedy was seeking support in Rosenberger for the 
notion that the government can choose to fund its own messages 
through restrictions on private speakers in order to further its 
policies, he naturally turned to Rust rather than Keller since the 
government had won in that case, and Keller was a compelled 
subsidy case rather than a restricted funding decision. The irony is 
that in Rosenberger, Southworth, and Velazquez, where Kennedy 
uncritically lifted the government speech doctrine out of its Keller 
context, his discussions were all dicta since the government was not a 
speaker in them. 
This raises the question of whether this uncritical translation of 
the Keller government speech doctrine to the restricted funding 
decisions mattered.71 I would argue that it did since what got lost in 
the translation was the principle that just as the government should 
not have carte blanche power to compel funding of disagreeable 
messages in every case where it speaks, so it should not have similar 
powers to impose speech restrictions on private speakers simply 
because they receive government money as part of a program that 
reflects a particular policy position. In other words, the 
Impracticability, Accountability, and Autonomy Principles also have 
                                                                                                           
 70.  United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 211–13 & n.7 (2003). 
 71.  As noted earlier, at least in the compelled subsidy decision in Southworth, Kennedy 
acknowledged that, consistent with Keller, there were some constraints on the government’s 
ability to escape constitutional scrutiny in those disputes, at least until Justice Scalia abandoned 
that notion in Johanns.  
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applicability in this context to limit the government’s ability to attach 
viewpoint or other restrictions to its funding grants that embody a 
given policy choice.  
Take Rust, for instance. Even though the Court did not analyze 
it as a government speech case, it might very well do so today despite 
its later waffling on that issue. And let us say that in addition to the 
abortion counseling restrictions required by the family planning 
grant program, it also contained a ban on criticizing those 
restrictions while operating within the program so as to protect the 
pro-life position being promoted.72 Under the current incarnation of 
the government speech doctrine, the ban on political criticism—
speech at the core of First Amendment concerns—would not be 
subject to constitutional scrutiny. Were the Keller contextual 
approach deployed, one would ask whether the three conceptual 
pillars of that doctrine support such a result. First, as to 
Impracticability, would it be possible to ask whether such a ban was 
germane to a legitimate and identifiable regulatory or funding 
program? Clearly the family planning grant program would be 
amenable to such an analysis, pointing away from a “constitutional 
scrutiny exemption” for government speech. 
Second, with respect to Accountability, how confident can one 
be that there would be meaningful public and political scrutiny of 
such a ban? Given that a speech restriction takes speech out of public 
discourse rather than affirmatively subjecting a government message 
to public scrutiny (as would be the case for compelled funding of 
government speech, for instance), any accountability would have to 
come from criticism of the ban itself outside of the grant program. 
While it is not impossible that this would occur, certainly there 
would not be near the public scrutiny of such an action as there 
would be if an affirmative government message were being 
propounded to the public and identified as such (thus revealing a 
substantial weakness in Kennedy’s uncritical importation of the 
government speech doctrine into funding restriction cases, and 
particularly his reliance on the democratic accountability rationale he 
used to justify it). This factor would again point away from an 
exemption for our hypothetical funding restriction. 
                                                                                                           
 72.  Presumably, a ban on criticizing the restrictions outside of the program would face 
serious constitutional problems under the “unconstitutional conditions” doctrine. See Rust v. 
Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 196–98 (1991). 
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Third, as to a restricted grantee’s Autonomy interests, one might 
argue that any impingement on his or her speech interests are, like 
an ordinary taxpayer in the compelled funding context, fairly 
attenuated since a grantee presumably consents to the restriction as a 
condition of receiving funding. But how is one to know whether 
such consent is truly voluntary in a given situation? One can imagine 
that for things like family planning, which is typically provided to 
individuals on the lower end of the income and education 
continuum, government money would be an important source of 
funding where restrictions attached thereto would realistically be 
nonnegotiable. And even if consent were truly voluntary, such a 
direct viewpoint restriction on what a grantee could say would, by its 
very nature, seemingly constitute a greater impingement on one’s 
autonomy interests than, say, having one’s money used to fund 
disagreeable speech. The Autonomy Principle, then, arguably points 
away from a scrutiny exemption in our hypothetical as well. 
The point is that not all, if any, speech restrictions attached to 
government funding programs that embody a particular policy 
position will merit a “constitutional pass” from having the 
government’s interests weighed against those of the affected 
speakers. Indeed, in our hypothetical it is highly doubtful that the 
government’s interest in promoting a pro-life position in the family 
planning context would warrant a ban on criticizing the abortion 
counseling restrictions—a core political right—in addition to the 
basic restrictions on abortion counseling itself. Hence, it seems clear 
that the separation of the government speech doctrine from the 
concerns which animated its original recognition in Keller—whether 
under Justice Kennedy’s uncritical importation of that doctrine into 
the restricted funding environment based on a mischaracterization of 
Rust, or under Justice Scalia’s attempt to justify that importation 
under a textualist rationale—is an unfortunate development in terms 
of protecting private speech interests that may be directly and 
substantially impacted by government speech activities. 
IV. CEMENTING AND EXTENDING A JURISPRUDENCE OF LABELS 
Since the compelled funding and government subsidy decisions 
culminated in the Johanns blanket First Amendment exemption for 
government speech in the last year of the Rehnquist Court (2005), 
the Roberts Court has been quick to extend that reformulated 
doctrine in two other areas of government-private speech conflicts. 
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The first concerns the speech of government employees, and the 
second consists of public fora speech. As to the former, the 
government speech doctrine seems to have become even further 
unhitched from its moorings in the Court’s recent decision in 
Garcetti v. Ceballos.73 There, writing again for a sharply divided 
Court, Justice Kennedy relied on the principles of the government 
speech doctrine to hold that a government prosecutor was not 
entitled to constitutional review of alleged retaliation against him by 
his supervisor for writing a memo accusing police officers of 
engaging in misconduct.74 The majority’s theory was essentially that 
when a government employee engages in speech pursuant to his or 
her job duties, such speech constitutes government speech that lies 
outside of First Amendment concerns rather than his or her own 
personal speech as a private citizen.75  
Prior to Garcetti, in speech disputes between the government 
and an employee, the Court had asked whether the employee’s 
speech was on a matter of public concern or was a private 
employment dispute as the criterion for applying or withholding 
First Amendment scrutiny to alleged retaliation for such speech.76 If 
the speech was of public concern, as it clearly was in Garcetti, the 
First Amendment interests of the employee and the listening public 
were deemed to merit constitutional scrutiny in the form of 
balancing the importance of those interests in a particular case 
against the government’s interest in being able to effectively and 
efficiently perform its functions if compelled to tolerate such 
speech.77 
To simply eliminate this weighing as a blanket rule pursuant to a 
government speech theory seems unfounded and unwise. Certainly 
the three conceptual pillars of the original doctrine would not 
countenance such an approach. With respect to the Impracticability 
Principle, the fact that before Garcetti courts routinely engaged in an 
assessment of whether government discipline of employee speech on 
matters of public concern was necessary for the government to 
perform its responsibilities, eliminates any objection that it would be 
impracticable to tell whether or not the impingement was required 
                                                                                                           
 73.  547 U.S. 410 (2006). 
 74.  Id. at 420–24. 
 75.  Id. at 421–22. 
 76.  Id. at 417–20. 
 77.  Id. 
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to accomplish a legitimate regulatory objective. Indeed, as the Court 
recounted in Garcetti, the court of appeals had determined that the 
government had “failed even to suggest disruption or inefficiency in 
the workings of the District Attorney’s Office as a result of the 
memo.”78 
As to political accountability for government speech as a 
substitute for judicial scrutiny of impingements on private interests 
affected by it, like the case of speech subsidy restrictions it is difficult 
to see how the government can be held to account for speech 
restrictions imposed under the banner of the government speech 
doctrine. If the government as employer is allowed to “exercise . . . 
control over what the employer itself has commissioned or created” 
in order to allow the government “to say what it wishes,”79 as Justice 
Kennedy would have it, then how is the public to assess the propriety 
of a message where the dissenting views of an employee have been 
squelched in the name of exercising that control? This turns the 
entire notion of democratic accountability for government speech on 
its head, particularly since the doctrine as applied in Garcetti has the 
effect of making the government less accountable for its potential 
misconduct. Imagine if the memo that the prosecutor in Garcetti 
had written to his supervisor accurately accused him or her of 
improperly covering up police corruption. Under the majority’s 
reasoning, since the memo would be government speech there 
would be no problem with the supervisor retaliating and suppressing 
the memo in order to shape the ultimate message heard by the 
public from the district attorney’s office.  
With respect to the Autonomy Principle, it seems obvious that 
the impact on the speech autonomy interests of a government 
employee disciplined for his or her speech on matters of public 
concern would be at least as serious as a group targeted with an 
assessment to fund speech with which they disagreed. Accordingly, 
the three main principles that drove the recognition of a First 
Amendment pass for the government to infringe on private speech 
interests in the cause of facilitating its functioning seem inapplicable 
in the government employee speech cases. And once again, the 
uncritical transposition of the government speech doctrine into this 
area of the Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence seems misguided 
and fraught with the potential for mischief. 
                                                                                                           
78.  Id. at 416 (quotation omitted). 
79.  Id. at 422 (citation and quotation omitted). 
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The second type of speech disputes to which the Roberts Court 
has applied the government speech doctrine involves access to public 
property for the purpose of expressing a message, and in particular 
the right of citizens to install permanent monuments in parks where 
the government has previously accepted one or more monuments for 
display. In Pleasant Grove City v. Summum,80 a religious group 
sought to install a permanent monument containing a religious 
message in a park where the government had accepted a Ten 
Commandments monument from a private donor years earlier.81 The 
Court rejected the argument that the park was a traditional public 
forum for the display of private monuments, holding that the Ten 
Commandments monument had become government speech when 
the city accepted it for permanent display and hence this action was 
exempt from First Amendment scrutiny or constraints (such as the 
requirement of viewpoint neutrality in maintaining a public forum).82 
Probably one of the least objectionable applications of the 
original government speech doctrine sanctioned by Keller to exempt 
governmental action from First Amendment scrutiny is its 
application to permanent monuments displayed in public parks 
under circumstances such as those presented in Summum. In the 
ordinary situation, a citizen desiring access to a park to install his 
own permanent monument is in much the same situation as a regular 
taxpayer who disagrees with general government speech. With 
respect to the Impracticability Principle, these cases will rarely 
involve defined regulatory programs or objectives by which a court 
could measure the germaneness or legitimacy of a speech 
impingement in terms of achieving those goals. 
Under the Accountability Principle, all the Justices in Summum 
seemed to agree that when the government accepts a permanent 
monument for display, most people perceive that it is essentially 
adopting the message conveyed by it as its own—and citizens can 
therefore object to that message if they wish. Although this does not 
completely solve the problem of democratic accountability for the 
viewpoint exclusion permitted by the government speech doctrine in 
these cases, at least the government message contained on the 
selected monuments would be prominently open to public scrutiny. 
                                                                                                           
 80.  129 S. Ct. 1125 (2009). 
 81.  Id. at 1129–30. The park contained other permanent monuments as well that 
collectively displayed a theme celebrating the city’s pioneering tradition. Id. 
 82.  Id. at 1131–38. 
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Hence, at least that message would presumably bear the imprimatur 
of democratic legitimacy. And as to the Autonomy Principle, the 
disappointed citizen whose permanent monument is rejected is not 
bearing any sort of special or selective burden to support the 
monuments that are displayed. Moreover, the private speech interests 
in being able to permanently display one’s own monument or 
message in a public park hardly seems that substantial given the 
myriad alternative avenues one might use to engage in public 
expression. 
Nonetheless, even here, there is reason to be concerned about 
categorically exempting these sorts of cases from First Amendment 
scrutiny. For instance, would a permanent memorial donated by 
Planned Parenthood celebrating Roe v. Wade be constitutional where 
fifty-one percent of a community’s voters consisted of pro-choice 
advocates and supported its installation in the face of staunch 
opposition by the rest of the community? Or better yet, could a 
government backed by that fifty-one percent of voters also reject a 
pro-life monument sponsored by the remaining forty-nine percent of 
voters who wanted to place it in the park as well? Given the 
substantial impingement on the speech autonomy interests of the 
dissenting taxpayers in these situations, it seems difficult to believe 
that the current Court would countenance the majority’s actions on 
a government speech theory. 
Perhaps that is why Justice Breyer penned a concurring opinion 
in Summum where he joined the majority opinion “on the 
understanding that the ‘government speech’ doctrine is a rule of 
thumb, not a rigid category . . . . In my view, courts must apply 
categories such as ‘government speech’ . . . with an eye towards their 
purposes—lest we turn ‘free speech’ doctrine into a jurisprudence of 
labels.”83 Indeed, Breyer explicitly argued that had the city in that 
case discriminated in its selection of monuments on grounds other 
than the “celebration of pioneering” theme displayed in the park, 
such as the political grounds posited in my Roe monument 
hypothetical, such an action might very well have violated the First 
Amendment.84  
Justice Breyer’s protest was quite ironic since he supplied Justice 
Scalia with the critical fifth vote (albeit while holding his nose) to 
give him a majority opinion for his bright line textualist reformation 
                                                                                                           
 83.  Id. at 1140 (Breyer, J., concurring).  
 84.  Id.  
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of the government speech doctrine in Johanns—the main case relied 
on by Justice Alito’s majority opinion in Summum to hold that the 
First Amendment was simply inapplicable to the monument dispute. 
Breyer’s belated warning85 would not be so unfortunate but for the 
mischief that the government speech doctrine will be capable of 
accomplishing in a wide breadth of cases—especially through its 
application by lower courts looking for a way to expediently deal 
with conflicts involving overlapping public and private speech 
interests that frequently arise. To take one of many available 
examples, a divided panel of a federal court of appeals recently ruled 
that the Secret Service could claim immunity for physically ejecting 
three citizens from a presidential speech that was open to the public 
simply because their car had an anti-war bumper sticker on it.86 The 
court ruled that a right against being subjected to such viewpoint 
discrimination by the government was not clearly established in 
significant part because the government speech doctrine permits 
such discrimination against citizens.87 Such is the dubious place 
where that revamped doctrine is taking the courts, precisely because 
it has not been “appl[ied] with an eye towards [its] purpose[]” in the 
Court’s post-Keller jurisprudence. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This Article has traced the recent establishment and evolution of 
the government speech doctrine in the Court’s decisions. I have 
argued that a concept originally intended to represent an analytical 
determination that government impingements on private speech 
interests merit an exemption from First Amendment scrutiny in a 
limited set of circumstances, has more recently devolved into a 
meaningless jurisprudence of labels that unduly subordinates those 
interests without inquiry into the merits of competing public 
interests. It is my view that this will result in a substantial 
diminishment in free speech protections for private speakers in the 
myriad of cases where government expression intersects and overlaps 
with formerly protected private speech interests. After Justice 
                                                                                                           
 85.  Justice Breyer’s warning in Summum reminds me of the good Friar Lawrence who 
supplies Juliet with a harmless “death potion,” but then sounds the alarm too late for poor 
Romeo. After more of these government speech cases, Justice Breyer may also bury his head in 
his hands and ask himself, “O, what haveth I wrought?”  
 86.  Weise v. Casper, 593 F.3d 1163 (10th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 7 (2010). 
 87.  Id. at 1165, 1170, 1169 n.1. 
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Breyer’s belated epiphany on this issue, it may once again be up to 
Justice Kennedy—who refused to join Justice Scalia’s recasting of the 
government speech doctrine in Johanns but unqualifiedly joined 
Justice Alito’s reaffirmation in Summum of the basic premise of 
Johanns—to determine whether he will join his more liberal 
colleagues on the Court in an effort to rediscover and reinvigorate 
the government speech doctrine’s original purpose. 
 
